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Veering Off the Abolitionist Path in America
Abstract
 In the 21st century, capital punishment in the United States stands 
as a peculiar institution. Despite widespread international movements 
for its abolition, and widespread expert agreement on its ills, the death 
penalty still persists in the United States. America remains the only 
country in the Western world to retain the death penalty today. We use it 
frequently, executing approximately 52 people per year, a rate comparable 
to both Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The question of why the United States 
still retains the death penalty has been the subject of debate for decades. 
Countless historical explanations have been posited, ranging from the 
religious to the political, from the racial, to the legal. The historical analysis 
of modern social institutions is important -- they help us understand why 
and how such institutions came to be normatively accepted and persistent 
in the world today. In this paper I will set out to examine why the United 
States retained the death penalty despite its initial suspension in 1972 by 
the Supreme Court under Furman v. Georgia. In doing so I will relate the 
narratives of two countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, and 
their experience with abolition in the post-World War II era.
Veering Off the Abolitionist Path in America: 
The Influence of the Ambiguously Written 
Constitution
Avinash Samarth
Introduction
“For centuries the death penalty, often accompanied by barbarous 
refinements, has been trying to hold crime in check; yet crime persists.” 
Albert Camus, Resistance, Rebellion, and Death1
 In the 21st century, capital punishment in the United States stands 
as a peculiar institution. Despite widespread international movements for 
its abolition, the death penalty still persists in the United States. America 
remains the only country in the Western world to retain the death penalty. 
We use it frequently, executing approximately fifty-two people per year, a 
rate comparable to that of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.2 
 The question of why the United States still retains the death penalty 
has been the subject of debate for decades. Countless historical explanations 
have been posited, ranging from the religious3 to the political,4 from the 
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racial5 to the legal.6 The historical analysis of modern social institutions is 
important -- they help us understand why and how such institutions came to 
be normatively accepted and persistent in the world.
 In this paper I will set out to examine why the United States retained 
the death penalty despite its initial suspension in 1972 by the Supreme Court 
under Furman v. Georgia. In doing so I will relate the narratives of two 
countries, the United States and the United Kingdom, and their experience 
with abolition in the post-World War II era. 
 Part I will detail the American narrative. I will capture the main 
abolitionist movement in the United States, which occurred between 1960 
and 1976.
 Part II will detail the British narrative. The major modern British 
abolitionist movement occurred slightly earlier than its American counterpart, 
from 1948 to 1969. 
 Part III will examine some potential explanations for the trajectories 
of these narratives. In doing so I will weigh the evidence for the impact 
of entrepreneurial political elite and public opinion, on the trajectory of 
abolition in both of these countries. Both explanations have very commonly 
been proposed and analyzed. The international comparison, moreover, will 
tease out parallels and/or contradictions to delineate what aspects of the 
American narrative can be explained with each.
 Part IV will examine the impact of the textual, written Constitution 
of the United States in the persistence of the death penalty and will compare 
it to that of the British experience. The United States and the United Kingdom 
differ in terms of their approaches to constitutionality. The American 
Constitution is codified. Codified constitutions are written and contain 
textual provisions that are binding on all state institutions and practices. The 
United Kingdom, on the other hand, has no formal written constitution -- 
it is “uncodified.” Instead of a single document, the English constitution is 
derived from a number of sources, including the laws passed by Parliament 
and from precedents established by judicial decisions. As a result, Parliament 
is not answerable to a ‘higher law;’ rather it can “make or unmake any law 
on any subject whatsoever.”7 More importantly for this analysis, capital 
punishment in England was not understood through any ambiguous 
normative standard that derived from an authoritative text. This is not the 
case in America, where the Constitution, specifically the Eighth Amendment, 
provided such a standard with which to judge capital punishment.
 From compiling these explanations together, I will conclude that 
although the influence of elite policy entrepreneurs and public opinion 
can, together, explain: (1) the initial movements for the abolition of capital 
punishment; and (2) why capital punishment became a prominent issue 
for British and American governments, it cannot adequately explain why 
America reneged on its abolition of the death penalty. 
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 I will also conclude that there is a tenable case to be made of the 
influence of the ambiguously written Constitution in veering the United States 
off its abolitionist path and pushing the country towards a reinstatement. 
I will show that the reasons for this phenomenon were twofold. First, the 
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment into the capital punishment debate 
diverted time and attention away from the discussion on the efficacy of capital 
punishment itself, a debate that the abolitionists in England showed could be 
won with objective data. Second, the shift of the debate to the meaning of 
“cruel and unusual punishments” moved the discussion away from social 
scientific searches for measurable behavior patterns towards interpretive 
searches for the best understanding of normative concepts.
Part I: The American Narrative
1960s and Prior: The Declining American Death Penalty
 The American 1960s were marked with strong movements towards 
civil and political rights, increased application of the social sciences to 
public policy, and a renewed interest in humanitarian public policies. In 
the wake of the Second World War, an increasing number of American 
politicians became concerned with preserving the “sanctity of human life” 
in both the political and legal realms.8 The attitude of the sixties was visibly 
present in its treatment of the death penalty. Throughout the decade, 
capital punishment met not only challenges to its legal codification, but also 
waned in frequency as a practice used by law enforcement, establishing two 
strong and identifiable paths towards abolition.
 The first path edged towards the de jure abolition of capital 
punishment in the United States. Even in the earliest part of the decade, 
opponents attacked American capital punishment “on several fronts” with 
an unprecedented furor.9 Members of Congress introduced bills to end 
particular mandatory capital punishment statutes, and other members 
introduced bills that banned capital punishment in its entirety. 
 Movements also occurred on grassroots levels. Churches and 
religious groups put pressure on both state and federal governments to 
change existing death penalty statutes.10 Elite opinion had begun to move 
away from supporting the death penalty, and even public support of the 
death penalty, which had always been relatively strong, fell to its weakest 
points in this decade.11 While in 1953, 70 percent of the public supported 
capital punishment, by 1966 that figure was down to 42 percent.12
 Within various state legislatures around the country, the death 
penalty lost even more battles. While Congress refused to ban the use of 
capital punishment, nine states (Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, and West Virginia) completely and explicitly 
abolished capital punishment by 1967.131415
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 In some of these cases, state legislatures were the actors that 
orchestrated the end of their states’ practices of capital punishment. In 
1963, for instance, the Michigan legislature amended its state constitution to 
prevent any possible attempts to reinstate the death penalty.16 Movements 
in other states were driven at the level of the citizenry. Oregon abolished the 
death penalty in 1964 by way of a public referendum, which passed with a 
large majority.17  
 The second abolitionist path was towards a de facto abolition of 
capital punishment, emerging as law enforcement officials sought and 
applied the death penalty less often. For even though forty-one states still 
had capital punishment on the books by the end of the 1960s, the frequency 
with which executions were carried out was dropping drastically, and the 
practice as a whole was becoming increasingly rare in the United States. 
Kansas, for example, ended up observing a de facto moratorium on capital 
punishment in the early sixties, because its Republican governor “just 
[didn’t] like killing people.”18 Judges, prosecutors, and juries were all more 
reluctant to impose the death penalty than in the past, preferring to dole out 
life sentences instead.1920 It appeared that even without significant abolitionist 
activity or grand legislative actions, the death penalty was falling out of favor 
throughout the country.21 
 The data illustrate this trend. In 1960, fifty-seven people were executed 
in total across the United States. This was down enormously from the earlier 
years of the twentieth century, in which as many as nearly 200 people were 
executed annually. As the sixties wore on, the frequency of executions fell 
even further: in 1963, twenty-one individuals were executed, in 1964, fifteen 
individuals were executed, and in 1965, the number executed had fallen to 
only seven. By 1968, a de facto moratorium on capital punishment was in 
effect in the United States, and no persons were executed for the rest of the 
decade.22 
The 1960s Legislative Debates over the Death Penalty
 As capital punishment came under increasing fire during the 1960s, 
members of the 86th, 87th, and 89th Congresses introduced several bills that 
were either partial steps towards or complete plans for its abolition. Although 
few of these proposals were ultimately enacted, they do provide valuable 
insight into the frame of the debates that occurred in the federal legislatures 
of the sixties regarding capital punishment. These debates reveal a strong 
focus on two points of interest: deterrence and morality.
 The major federal bills regarding capital punishment are enumerated 
as follows, in chronological order. In 1960, Representative Abraham Multer 
(D-NY) introduced H.R. 870, a bill to ban all capital punishment on the federal 
level.23 In 1962, Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR) attempted twice to amend H.R. 
5143 to prevent all executions in the District of Columbia.24 In 1966, Senator 
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Philip Hart (D-MI) introduced a bill in the Senate (S. 3646), joined by nine 
other senators, abolishing the death penalty for all federal crimes.25 Also in 
1966, Representative Robert Kastenmeier (D-WI) introduced a bill to abolish 
the death penalty in its totality, under “all laws of the United States.”2627
 The leading concern in discussing these bills, as Representative 
Multer pointed out in his testimony before the House Judiciary Committee 
in support of H.R. 870, was “whether we can justify the death penalty on 
the ground that it prevents or deters crime.”28 As bills, amendments, and 
arguments were levied against or for capital punishment, each side stressed 
the issue of deterrence. Concerning H.R. 870, Representative Multer 
immediately submitted into the record the results of Great Britain’s 1953 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which could find no link between 
the death penalty and murder rates.29 Senator Hart, when introducing S. 3646 
in the Senate, focused the debate on what he called the “key question” -- 
whether or not “the death penalty deter[s] and prevent[s] similar crimes in 
the future.” He then published six statements of penologists, professors, and 
police officers, all testifying that it did not.30 
 Senator Morse similarly called upon a wealth of expert articles and 
testimony to justify what he viewed as the first of his main points regarding 
the death penalty, deterrence. He declared that:
“It is pretty well established by a great many research studies, and 
pretty well established in the authoritative writings of many of our 
criminologists and penologists, that many  people labor under 
the misconception that capital punishment is an effective deterrent 
to crime. The research studies do not bear that out […].”31
Senator Morse “assure[d] everyone” that he would “urge that 
criminologists and penologists be called in to testify” on the issue of 
deterrence. In the meantime, he placed in the record two articles explicitly to 
“demonstrate how capital punishment has failed to deter crime.”32
 But arguments over deterrence were not solely the concern of 
the death penalty abolitionists. The second concern that the congressmen 
consistently identified was the issue of morality. These arguments claimed 
either that the death penalty is wrong because ‘thou shalt not kill,’ or that the 
death penalty is legitimate because of ‘eye-for-an-eye’ principles of justice. 
Representative Multer argued, “There is a moral question involved in the 
justice of capital punishment” because “innocent men have been executed” 
and “life is sacred.”33 He explained, “Only God with his infinite wisdom 
and charity should wield that awful power [to execute].”34 Senator Morse 
similarly argued, “The taking of life is the prerogative of God, and not of 
men.”35 In the same speech, Morse summarized his points against the death 
penalty:
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“First, I consider it to be immoral. Second, I do not consider it to be 
an effective deterrent to crime. Third, I think the time has come when 
we ought to set a good example of high civilization and make clear 
that we no longer resort to the eye-for-an-eye […] jungle law.”36
The Involvement of the Courts
 Up until the end of the 1960s, the courts had nothing to say about the 
constitutionality of the death penalty itself. Not only had the death penalty 
been widely accepted throughout the nation’s history, its constitutionality per 
se had never been formally challenged in any court.37 In fact, the practice had 
been in wide use at the time the Constitution was written and implemented, 
and few people, if any, thought that the Constitution had any sort of implicit 
or explicit goal of abolishing capital punishment.38 Illustrative of this general 
understanding, neither litigants, nor the press, nor public interest groups 
had ever focused on the constitutionality of capital punishment itself in any 
substantial manner.39 Even the American Civil Liberties Union did not, at 
the time, consider capital punishment to be a civil rights issue.40 But as the 
transformative sixties continued, and as the Warren Court gave a friendlier 
ear to minority-held and liberal ideas, it appeared that the Court might finally 
be poised to wrestle with the issue of capital punishment on constitutional 
grounds.41
 The first steps toward court involvement regarding the 
constitutionality of the death penalty came not in the forms of amicus briefs or 
arguments from litigants or interest groups, but came instead from the ‘top-
down’ -- from constitutional experts and a particularly interested Supreme 
Court Justice. In 1961, attorney Gerald Gottlieb published a prominent article 
in the University of Southern California Law Review contending that the 
American death penalty was of questionable constitutionality, specifically 
crafting his argument under the Eighth Amendment.42 Gottlieb was not 
concerned whether or not capital punishment deterred crime. Rather, he 
argued that the death penalty had become unconstitutional because of 
the “changed standards of decent conduct” in modern times.43 He linked 
these standards to the Eighth Amendment and its dynamic ban on “cruel 
and unusual punishments” by way of Trop v. Dulles,44 a case in which the 
Supreme Court held that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment was not very 
precise, and therefore “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”45 Gottlieb’s novel 
argument helped set the legal stage for the courts to address the question of 
capital punishment outside of the domain of the legislature, and within the 
domain of the Constitution.
 Two years later, Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg circulated a 
memorandum to the other eight Justices on the Supreme Court regarding six 
capital cases for which certiorari petitions were pending.46 Justice Goldberg 
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specifically discussed the constitutionality of the death penalty and the 
possible arguments with which the practice could be challenged.47 This type 
of memorandum was unusual for a Supreme Court Justice, and surprising 
to many on the Court, including Justice William Brennan, who observed, 
“in not one of the six cases had any party directly challenged the validity of 
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”48 
 Despite Justice Goldberg’s efforts, the six cases were not granted 
certiorari. This still gave him an opportunity to publish a dissenting opinion 
against the denial of certiorari, which he did for Rudolph v. Alabama49. He 
suggested that the Court “should have heard the case to consider whether 
the Constitution permitted the imposition of death on a convicted rapist 
who has neither taken nor endangered human life.”50 Goldberg also made 
reference to Trop v. Dulles in the same manner as had Gottlieb two years 
prior, similarly asking whether or not the “imposition of the death penalty 
[…] violate[s] ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of [our] 
maturing society,”51 giving more credence to the possible link between the 
Eighth Amendment and capital punishment. 
 The dissenting opinion of Justice Goldberg awakened a strong 
interest in bringing the issue of capital punishment into the realm of 
litigation. Michael Meltsner, the assistant counsel to the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund in the 1960s, wrote that before Goldberg’s dissent, “no one 
seriously considered making the enormous effort that would be required” to 
challenge the constitutionality of capital punishment.52 But although interest 
in challenging capital punishment in the courts had just been awakened, it 
was quickly and cleverly put into action. The NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund 
(often referred to as ‘The Fund’), joined in the late 1960s by the ACLU, was 
the leading group behind this effort. 
 By the mid-sixties, the movement for anti-capital punishment 
litigation had “gained impressive momentum.”53 Courts on both federal 
and state levels rendered decisions of one kind or another regarding capital 
punishment statutes. Until 1972, the Supreme Court frequently modified the 
procedures and methods by which capital punishment could be carried out 
in the United States. 
 In 1968 the Supreme Court rendered the first blow to capital 
punishment, delivered in their opinion of Witherspoon v. Illinois.54 
Prosecutors at the time could reject potential jury members because of their 
conscientious qualms about capital punishment, and in the case of William 
C. Witherspoon, the prosecution had used this justification to dismiss half of 
the potential jury pool. The Supreme Court ruled that such a practice gave an 
unfair bias to the prosecution and deprived the defendant of the right to an 
impartial jury.55 While Witherspoon did not address capital punishment on 
the grounds of the Eighth Amendment, it did create a significant hurdle for 
prosecutors intent on seeking the death penalty in their cases. And because 
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of the significant blow to capital punishment Witherspoon was thought to 
represent, the decision announced to potential litigants that the Supreme 
Court held a favorable attitude toward criticisms of capital punishment.
 Fund attorneys were relentless in attempting to get the Court to rule 
on the constitutional arguments they were advancing. In Boykin v. Alabama,56 
the attorneys argued that the infrequent, arbitrary, and discriminatory use 
of the death penalty as a punishment for robbery was “cruel and unusual” 
per the Eighth Amendment.57 The Court, however, skipped over these 
arguments and remanded the case back to the state trial court on the ground 
that Boykin’s guilty pleas had not been entered properly (there was no record 
the Boykin had made them “voluntarily and understandingly”).58
 The next year, Fund lawyers made another attempt in Maxwell v. 
Bishop,59 challenging the practice of a unitary capital trial, in which a jury 
will rule on guilt and punishment simultaneously. The Court again ignored 
the constitutional arguments levied by the Fund lawyers and sent the case 
back to a state trial court on the ground that Witherspoon had been violated 
(Maxwell had been sentenced by a jury that prosecutors had filtered out so 
that it did not contain citizens who were wary of capital punishment).60
 In 1972, the Supreme Court heard the case of Furman v. Georgia61 
and finally addressed the constitutional arguments presented by the Fund 
lawyers. The attorneys levied several arguments, both targeting capital 
punishment per se and Georgia’s capital punishment statute in particular. 
In the attorneys’ most heavy-hitting argument, they claimed that the “death 
penalty, as administered in the second half of the twentieth century, [is] 
inconsistent with evolving standards of decency.”62 Drawing upon Trop 
v. Dulles, the attorneys hoped to convince the Supreme Court Justices that 
capital punishment had become a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 
Constitution. 
 But in contemplating these issues the Supreme Court found itself 
very divided. By the time its decision was handed down, there was no 
majority opinion in the case. Instead, each Justice had written his own 
opinion. There were five concurring opinions, written by Justices Brennan, 
Douglas, Marshall, Stewart, and White, and four dissenting opinions, written 
by Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.63
 The concurring Justices agreed that the death penalty statutes 
presented before the Court were “arbitrary and capricious” and therefore 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishment.”64 Even so, there were large points of disagreement among 
these Justices. Only Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall regarded capital 
punishment per se as unconstitutional. The other three, Justices Douglas, 
Stewart, and White, limited their objections to the way in which capital 
punishment was meted out under Georgia’s death penalty statute (for reasons 
that also applied to thirty-nine other capital punishment statutes in the 
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United States). Together, the Justices believed that Georgia’s statute, under 
which Furman was being tried, could and would lead to arbitrary sentencing. 
They identified jury discretion as the problem: because the law gave the jury 
too much power in deciding whether or not to execute a defendant, the law 
thereby allowed jurors’ prejudices to impact sentencing decisions.65 This 
meant that executions were decided “wantonly and freakishly.”66 
 Despite these differing opinions, Furman effectively rendered capital 
punishment, as it then existed under forty U.S. Federal and State laws, 
unconstitutional. The positions of Douglas, Stewart, and White, however, 
made it clear that the Supreme Court did not believe that capital punishment 
itself was unconstitutional. Rather, the methods by which it was meted out 
at the time made it unconstitutional.
 Unsurprisingly, several states took the next few years to rewrite their 
death penalty statutes in efforts to meet the criticisms levied by Douglas, 
Stewart, and White. In 1976, several of these laws came before the Supreme 
Court in a slew of cases: Gregg v. Georgia67, Jurek v. Texas,68 Proffitt v. 
Florida,69 Woodson v. North Carolina,70 and Roberts v. Louisiana.71 These 
cases were consolidated into Gregg and decided on July 2, 1976, just four 
years after the Furman decision . 
 In a 7-2 decision the Court upheld death penalty statutes that gave 
juries “guided discretion” for invoking the death penalty, finding these 
versions of capital punishment not to be unconstitutionally arbitrary.72 The 
opinion of the 1976 Court also noted that capital punishment itself did not 
violate the Eighth Amendment, citing the “marked indication of society’s 
endorsement of the death penalty, […] [in] the legislative response to 
Furman.”73 Paying close attention to public opinion polls, the Gregg decisions 
reinstated capital punishment, effectively ending the moratorium imposed 
by Furman.74 
 Executions resumed on January 17, 1977, when a Utah firing squad 
shot and killed Gary Gilmore, a convicted killer who had requested execution 
by that means.75
The 1970s Legislative Debates over the Death Penalty
 The unexpected voice of the Supreme Court regarding the 
constitutionality of capital punishment toward the end of the 1960s and into 
the 1970s reverberated in the debates of the 91st, 92nd, and 93rd Congresses. 
While the 1960s saw a relatively large number of debates over the issue 
compared to other periods of American history, the frequency of such debate 
in the 1970s dwarfed even those. Legislators campaigning against capital 
punishment scrambled to formally suspend the death penalty, worrying 
that the de facto and unstable judicial moratorium could easily fall apart, 
resulting in an extraordinary bloodbath. Legislators campaigning to protect 
capital punishment scrambled to pass laws that they believed would stand 
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up against the Court’s judicial review. Each side recognized the importance 
standards of decency” point towards the “repudiation of automatic death 
sentences.”89 The Court ruled that the various legislatures that passed these 
new statutes had effectively remedied the capriciousness found in earlier 
applications of the death penalty and had avoided problems under the Eighth 
Amendment.90 In later decisions, the Court returned to the constitutionality 
of specific methods and practices with which capital punishment was meted 
out, rather than reconsidering the constitutionality of the punishment itself. 
 The 1960s trend toward abolition did not only reverse in the realm 
of the federal courts after the Gregg decisions. By the late 1970s, public 
opinion was swinging evermore strongly in favor of the death penalty, and 
the frequency with which it was challenged in both the state legislatures 
and Congress fell drastically.91 Juries and judges both became much more 
willing to sentence defendants to death, evidenced by the explosion of the 
number of people on death row after the moratorium was lifted. By the end 
of the twentieth century, the frequency of executions had returned to levels 
reminiscent of the early 1950s, and death row was over ten times larger than 
it had been in the early sixties.92
Part II: The English Narrative
The 1940s: Ambiguity in the Debate
 By the 1940s, capital punishment had been in widespread use for 
centuries in the United Kingdom. But from the early 1800s to the late 1920s, 
there was a steady march to curb both its frequency and its severity.93 While 
these slow movements accomplished some feats, including a decrease in the 
number of crimes punishable by death and the end of all public executions, 
it was not until the late 1940s that efforts for complete abolition of the death 
penalty began to be taken seriously in government. After World War II, as 
the nation “felt sickened by [...] wholesale slaughter” and the “holocaust of 
Nazi Germany”94, the British Parliament began to consider the possibility of 
abolishing the death penalty from all future use. These sentiments created a 
prime opportunity for Parliament to begin serious debate over the abolition 
of capital punishment in the 1940s. But in all of these debates, information 
was sparse, and opposing arguments frequently cited contradictory facts, 
especially in regards to the efficacy of the practice.
 As it existed at the time, the “punishment for murder prescribed 
by English law was […] the punishment of death.”95 Capital punishments 
for murder were largely mandatory in nature -- judges had no power with 
which to discriminate in doling out capital punishments in certain murder 
cases over others. And although by the twentieth century murder was the 
only crime for which the death penalty was exercised in practice, there were 
still on average 12 persons executed per year in Britain.96
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 The laws of murder, however, came under fire in the years directly 
after the War’s end early 1945.97 In May of that year, the Labour Party won 
an unprecedented victory in national elections, and for the first time in 
British history the democratic-socialist party held a large majority of seats in 
the House of Commons.98 With a party known to be favorable towards the 
lessening of penal severity in a position of substantial power, the Howard 
League began a significant “propagandistic” assault upon the British 
death penalty.99 The Howard League, amalgamated from two earlier penal 
reform interest groups in 1921, was an influential “insider” organization 
in British politics.100 Its members were largely middle-class and wealthy 
professionals and it “functioned as a small, well-connected, London-based 
elite” organization.101 The Howard League held it partly to be their mission 
to publish and disseminate informational pamphlets urging the electorate to 
move towards abolition.102
  But alongside their goal of educating public opinion on the moral ills 
of the death penalty, the group worked hard to urge members of Parliament 
to take action in London. Coming before the House of Commons in 1947 
was the Criminal Justice Bill,103 introduced by Home Secretary Chuter-
Ede and aimed at humanizing the British penal processes.104 The Howard 
League urged “that the Criminal Justice Bill [of 1947] should include a clause 
abolishing the death penalty” and they received support from 190 members 
of Parliament in response to their efforts.105 
 When the 1947 Criminal Justice Bill was read in the House of 
Commons, it stimulated an unprecedented flood of debate regarding the 
abolition of capital punishment.106 Sydney Silverman and Reginald Paget, 
two members of the Labour Party who vehemently criticized the death 
penalty, made the strongest speeches. Silverman emphasized the need for a 
strong movement against capital punishment to emanate from the House of 
Commons.107 He believed the House of Commons to be a true representation 
of the educated opinion of the British people and argued that the people 
themselves should ultimately decide the fate of the death penalty.108 
Silverman expressly noted that little dependence should be placed upon 
judges, who, he rhetorically exclaimed, “have always been demonstrably 
and completely wrong.”109 Silverman believed the House of Commons, as 
opposed to all other components of British politics, provided a good “cross-
section of the mind of the community.”110
 Paget crystallized his arguments in two ways: he first criticized the 
nature of capital punishment as a primitive act of retribution and second noted 
that there is “really only one question” of capital punishment: deterrence.111 
Paget was also concerned by the power of government to take away the life 
of an individual: “Let the dictators have their gallows and their axes, their 
firing squads and their lethal chambers. The citizens of a free democracy did 
not have to shelter under the shadow of the gallows tree.”112
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 The Howard League declared on the first page of its journal in 1948 
that the extended debates over capital punishment during the readings of 
the Criminal Justice Bill were the “beginning of the end” of the death penalty 
in Britain.113 Not only did the debates legitimize the issue of abolition in 
Parliament, but they also spread interest within the general public. The 
Times, for instance, took up the topic beginning in the late 1940s. In a leading 
editorial in November 1947, the newspaper asked whether “the death 
penalty deter[s] more effectively than other punishment,” and answered its 
own question, stating, “nowhere has abolition led to an increase in crime.”114 
The Times, as a whole, conveyed an air of support for the abolitionist side 
and would continue to do so throughout the coming decades.
 The next year, in March of 1948, Sydney Silverman sponsored an 
amendment to the Criminal Justice Bill to put a de jure moratorium on the 
British death penalty for a period of five years. Debates once again centered 
on the principles on which capital punishment was based and the efficacy 
of the practice as a deterrent against crime. Silverman reiterated Paget’s 
remarks from the previous debate, arguing that the retributive principle of 
punishment was fundamentally wrong and that it was the duty of Parliament 
to raise the standards of human conduct after the horrors seen in World 
War II.115 While Silverman opened the debate by characterizing the death 
penalty as “revolting” and “barbarous,” opponents like Sir John Anderson 
emphasized their faith in the efficacy of the death penalty.116 Anderson noted 
that to his own knowledge, he could not think of anyone who had been 
wrongly executed.117
 The clause passed the House of Commons by a vote of 245 to 222 
and was added to the Criminal Justice Bill, which itself also passed, and so 
on June 1 and 2, the issue of abolition was put before the House of Lords.118 
The House of Lords was not nearly as favorable towards the idea of abolition 
as the House of Commons, and this soon became apparent in debate. The 
“great bulk of speeches delivered” on the bill were in favor of the retention 
of the death penalty.119 Nevertheless, debate was extensive, lasting for two 
days.120
 While a handful of members supported the clause, the vast majority 
of Lords stood against its passage. Viscount Templewood, standing in 
favor of the clause, cited Sweden and Switzerland as empirical examples of 
governments that had shown that murderers could be reformed and did not 
need to be killed to be deterred from killing again.121 The Lord Archbishop 
Canterbury, on the other hand, criticized the evidence from other countries, 
noting, “nobody can say how far any individual is deterred by that warning 
[of death].”122 Lord Pethick-Lawrence recognized the same, but used this as 
platform for supporting the clause, noting, “quite […] frankly, I say that if it 
were proved to me conclusively, […] that the abolition of capital punishment 
would lead to an increase in the murder rate, I would not stand for its 
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abolition.”123 Lord Roche, basing his opinion “on [his] experience,” argued 
that in practice, the death penalty was only applied to those who society 
truly needed to execute, and the rest he believed had been reprieved.124 
Although Viscount Templewood was very vocal throughout the debate, 
offering frequent commentary against the retentionists’ arguments, the 
House of Lords rejected the abolitionist clause by an overwhelming 181 to 
28.125 
 The question of public opinion took on a larger role during and 
after the 1948 debates in the House of Commons. Although there was little 
data on the topic at the time, there was “some indication that the nation as 
a whole did not support the suspension of capital punishment” as voted by 
the House of Commons.126 Letters written in to The Times, for instance, were 
overwhelmingly retentionist. The very notion of public opinion, however, 
was debated heatedly in Parliament in the context of abolition. While 
Silverman had argued that the question of abolition should not be left up 
to judges, he also noted that the whims of the general, uneducated, and 
ignorant public should not be decisive on abolition. Viscount Templewood 
made similar remarks, arguing that the opinions of the general public were 
inevitably ignorant about the proper issues in debate over abolition.127 
Viscount Samuel pointed out that the large majority in favor of abolition in 
the House of Commons was probably even larger than had been recorded, as 
ministers in favor of abolition had been compelled to abstain.128 He believed 
that the extreme divergence between the public and the House of Commons 
was evidence that the true opinion of the ‘public’ was wholly misinformed on 
the issue of capital punishment. Viscount Templewood agreed, noting that 
if Parliament had relied upon public opinion in the past when restricting the 
death penalty, it would have found that public opinion was always against 
the “expert” views of Parliament.129 Whether or not to take into account the 
opinion of the public, and who exactly constituted ‘the public,’ were issues 
not resolved by the end of the 1940s.
 As the debate over the abolitionist measure unfolded, it became clear 
that the British politicians were severely lacking in objective information 
about capital punishment. Many members of Parliament resorted to their 
own experiences or hearsay anecdotes to support their arguments, and many 
of them cited bits of information that clearly contradicted each other. There 
was, at the time, a general lack of “basic information on the actual effects of 
capital punishment.”130 Criminal statistics were virtually unknown, foreign 
experience was difficult to obtain or relate back to English terms, and prior 
Royal Commission reports were much like the arguments of reformers: 
collections of Biblically based, morality-fueled opinions on the “evils of 
the death penalty.”131 In an effort to remedy this lack of information, Home 
Secretary Chuter Ede announced a Royal Commission in 1949 to empirically 
study the question of limiting the death penalty in Great Britain.132
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The 1950s: A Royal Commission and Shifts in the National Atmosphere
 In the 1950s capital punishment developed into a major issue in 
British politics. The reasons for this were threefold. First, the 1953 report 
published by the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, which 
distinguished itself from prior commissions by relying on the social sciences 
and solid facts, rather than mere conjecture, identified several shortcomings 
of the death penalty.133 Second, the Fifties in England were marred by 
high-profile capital cases that resulted in executions largely thought by the 
public to be miscarriages of justice. Third, eager abolitionist members of 
Parliament, supported whole-heartedly by the Howard League and armed 
with the evidence of the Royal Commission, took advantage of the wavering 
atmosphere over capital punishment. These three forces led to two major 
legislative developments: the introduction of the Death Penalty (Abolition) 
Bill of 1956 and the compromise that resulted from its failure, the Homicide 
Bill of 1957.134 
 The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment finished their 
investigation by 1953. After hearing the testimony of 118 witnesses and 
producing a report that exceeded five hundred pages, the Commission 
officially recommended a series of modifications to the practice of capital 
punishment. These included giving discretion to juries over when to impose 
the death penalty, as well as replacing the current method of execution, 
hanging, with lethal injection.135 From Europe, the Commission listened 
“almost exclusively to experts -- criminologists, prison officials, judges, 
doctors, [and] criminal law professors.”136
 Witnesses testifying in front of the Commission gave facts and 
opinions that were centered on the deterrent value of the death penalty. 
Sir Frank Newsam, permanent undersecretary at the Home Office, testified 
that in his experience, the average murderer was not of irredeemably bad 
character, and did not especially need to be deterred from ever committing a 
crime again by imposing death.137
 The Chief Constables’ Association of England and Wales and the 
Police Federation disagreed, however, believing capital punishment to be 
a deterrent, especially to those who were violent, and a group of chaplains 
agreed. Nevertheless, testimony in support of deterrence of the death penalty 
was largely limited to opinion rather than scientific fact.138
 The Howard League, on the other hand, submitted a memorandum 
analyzing the empirical effects of abolition on other countries. It showed that 
there was no evidence that abolition did not result in an increase in murder, 
nor that the restoration of the death penalty had ever resulted in a decrease.139
 While the Commission did not ultimately recommend abolition, 
the Commission did marshal together “an impressive array of evidence 
against the death penalty” that supported “significant doubts about its 
deterrence.”140 After wading through mounds of statistical evidence, the 
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report stated that the uniquely deterrent force of the death penalty was likely 
“exaggerated,” and that it is “important […] not to base a penal policy in 
relation to murder on exaggerated estimates of the uniquely deterrent force 
of the death penalty.”141  
 While the British movement against capital punishment was always 
“basically a humanitarian campaign,” at this point it had become “modern 
and scientific,” relying on sociology and psychology to scrutinize the 
efficacy and legitimacy of capital punishment in the United Kingdom.142 This 
gave abolitionists a strong new leg on which to stand. Although they had 
classically been limited to “moral and humanitarian bases” of arguments in 
the earlier decade, they could now “prove objectively and scientifically that 
the abolition of capital punishment would be advantageous to the nation.”143
 While the Commission was holding its sessions on capital 
punishment, three very controversial, and very public, capital cases were 
held and tried by the Government.144 The first of these three was the trial 
of Timothy Evans. Evans was accused in 1950 of murdering his wife and 
daughter and was subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. During 
the course of his trial, Evans had accused John Christie, his upstairs neighbor, 
of being responsible for the two murders. Evans was hanged in March of that 
year. Three years after Evans’ trial, Christie was discovered to be a serial 
killer, responsible for murdering several women at his property, including 
his own wife, consequently raising serious doubt about Evans’ conviction.145
 The second of these cases was the trial of Derek Bentley in 1952. 
Bentley, a nineteen-year-old boy, was accused and convicted of the murder 
of Police Constable Sidney Miles, who was shot and killed during a burglary 
attempt carried out by Bentley and his accomplice Christopher Craig. Bentley 
was sentenced to death despite the fact that Craig had been the one to actually 
shoot PC Miles and despite the fact that Bentley had been in police custody 
at the time of the killing.146 Craig did not receive the death penalty, as he 
was only sixteen years old and therefore underage. During the course of the 
investigation, a psychiatrist had also concluded that Bentley appeared to be 
borderline retarded.147
 The third case to spark public interest in abolition was the trial of Ruth 
Ellis in 1955. 28-year-old Ellis was executed for the murder of her unfaithful 
lover, David Blakely, having shot him with four bullets outside a pub on 
Easter Sunday, and thereby committing what other countries would have 
deemed a crime passionel.148 Ellis was the last woman executed in Britain 
and one of the few women to be subjected to the penalty in all of twentieth 
century England. While there was no doubt regarding Ellis’ guilt, there was 
doubt about her state of mind and doubt about the appropriateness of her 
sentence, especially given the commonplace of reprieves at the time.149
 The public’s reaction to these three cases was both large and 
vociferous. All three had been generally perceived to be “miscarriages 
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of justice.”150 In the weeks before Bentley was executed, his case became a 
“cause célèbre” amongst the British people. In stark contrast to England’s 
older public executions, on the night before the Bentley execution, over three 
hundred people gathered to protest his sentence.151 In support of granting 
reprieve to Ellis, numerous petitions were submitted to the Home Office, some 
containing thousands of signatures. She garnered a great deal of sympathy 
because of her young age, her children, the impulsive and passionate nature 
of the murder she committed, and the fact that she was an attractive blonde 
woman.152 Evans’ case saw the most backlash, although it only occurred 
posthumously. The likelihood of his innocence prompted even Parliament to 
mention the issue and criticize the Home Office in the mid-1950s.153
 By 1956, there was increasing pressure from the public, from the 
release of the report by the Royal Commission, and from various abolitionists 
in Parliament, for a new debate on capital punishment. The abolition of the 
death penalty had “developed into a leading issue on the British scene,” and 
in that summer, the House of Commons debated and voted on the Death 
Penalty (Abolition) Bill, introduced by Sydney Silverman the year prior.154
 The Howard League and the National Campaign for the Abolition 
of Capital Punishment helped link the public’s newfound interest in capital 
punishment with the dealings of Parliament. The groups were well suited for 
this. The Howard League was an organization that “enjoyed a close working 
relationship with the Home Office.”155 The NCACP was partly founded by 
Silverman himself, and assisted in the abolitionist effort by initiating an 
“intensive drive for abolition” in the same year.156 The NCACP organization 
soon had over 20,000 members.157
 The NCACP was led by Gerland Gardiner, a prominent barrister, and 
Victor Gollancz, a publisher and charismatic activist.158 It was the occupation 
of the latter that allowed the NCACP to substantially affect the public 
atmosphere surrounding capital punishment. Alongside public meetings in 
many important cities in Britain, the organization published several pieces of 
literature, spurring public interest in abolition, based on both emotional and 
scientific appeals.159
 The mass of literature included Gollancz’ own Capital Punishment: 
The Heart of the Matter and Arthur Koestler’s Reflections on Hanging. 
Both works were passionate polemics against capital punishment that 
based themselves on moral arguments. As Gollancz succinctly stated in his 
work: “Capital punishment is wrong and that is all there is to it.”160 Koestler 
similarly focused on the art of polemic, but also wrote detailed the experience 
of other abolitionist countries, as well as delving into the emotional and 
personal aspects of a series of murders in Britain, all in an effort to disprove 
the alleged deterrence of the death penalty.161 The NCACP also connected 
abolitionist members of Parliament with the public, allowing both Sydney 
Silverman and Reginald Paget the ability to publish pamphlets as part of the 
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NCACP’s efforts. Their works included Hanged and Innocent?, a short book 
identifying several miscarriages of justice in the practice of the death penalty, 
including the execution of Timothy Evans.
 Debate on the Abolition Bill did not ignore the rapid changes in 
public interest, although Parliament was unsure how to deal with it. While 
Montgomery Hyde noted that public opinion was changing in support of 
abolition,162 Sir Robert Grimston argued that the public had been exposed to 
misleading propaganda.163 By 1956, 45 percent of the public disapproved of 
a trial suspension of capital punishment -- 24 percentage points lower than 
recent years past.164
 Nevertheless, debate over Silverman’s bill did not see any new 
arguments that had not already been mentioned in the Parliamentary 
discourse. Abolitionists continued to argue that capital punishment was not 
uniquely a deterrent, while retentionists saw it as necessary to keep homicide 
rates low.165 The abolitionists in Commons were victorious again, with a vote 
of 286 to 262.166 
 The Bill was then passed along to the House of Lords, where debate 
opened on July 9. While several Lords voiced their opinions in favor of 
abolition (in fact “nearly twice as large as had been expected”),167 the bill was 
“thoroughly trounced” with a vote of 238 to 95.168 At the center of the Lords 
debate was whether capital punishment was a uniquely effective deterrent, 
greater than life imprisonment.169 While Viscount Templewood cited the 
Royal Commission’s inability to find sufficient evidence of such a notion, 
MPs like the Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir170 and Viscount Malvern171 
expressed their wholehearted opinion that capital punishment served as a 
deterring force in the United Kingdom. 
 Although the Government and the House of Lords stood strong 
against abolition, they could not ignore the constant pressure arising out 
of the House of Commons on the subject. The Cabinet was faced with a 
dilemma: it did not favor the complete abolition of capital punishment, but 
it recognized that there was a large demand from Commons for the practice 
to be reformed. The Cabinet wrestled with the question of deterrence. While 
they admitted that many other countries had abolished capital punishment 
without effect, they did not see Britain as civilized enough to deal with its 
abolition. The Cabinet was certain that Britain, as a unique society, would 
see a disastrous rise in homicide rates if capital punishment were done away 
with.172
 A compromise seemed on the horizon, and it came in the form of 
the 1957 Homicide Bill, introduced by Home Secretary Lloyd George in 
November of 1956. The Home Secretary had personally recommended that 
capital punishment not be abolished173 and the Government justified the 
bill’s support by noting, “public opinion desired a compromise and did not 
want total abolition.”174 The bill, however, did not modify the death penalty 
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per se.of justice.”150 In the weeks before Bentley was executed, his case 
became a “cause célèbre” amongst the British people. In stark contrast to 
England’s older public executions, on the night before the Bentley execution, 
over three hundred people gathered to protest his sentence.151 In support of 
granting reprieve to Ellis, numerous petitions were submitted to the Home 
Office, some containing thousands of signatures. She garnered a great deal 
of sympathy because of her young age, her children, the impulsive and 
passionate nature of the murder she committed, and the fact that she was 
an attractive blonde woman.152 Evans’ case saw the most backlash, although 
it only occurred posthumously. The likelihood of his innocence prompted 
even Parliament to mention the issue and criticize the Home Office in the 
mid-1950s.153
 By 1956, there was increasing pressure from the public, from the 
release of the report by the Royal Commission, and from various abolitionists 
in Parliament, for a new debate on capital punishment. The abolition of the 
death penalty had “developed into a leading issue on the British scene,” and 
in that summer, the House of Commons debated and voted on the Death 
Penalty (Abolition) Bill, introduced by Sydney Silverman the year prior.154
 The Howard League and the National Campaign for the Abolition 
of Capital Punishment helped link the public’s newfound interest in capital 
punishment with the dealings of Parliament. The groups were well suited for 
this. The Howard League was an organization that “enjoyed a close working 
relationship with the Home Office.”155 The NCACP was partly founded by 
Silverman himself, and assisted in the abolitionist effort by initiating an 
“intensive drive for abolition” in the same year.156 The NCACP organization 
soon had over 20,000 members.157
 The NCACP was led by Gerland Gardiner, a prominent barrister, and 
Victor Gollancz, a publisher and charismatic activist.158 It was the occupation 
of the latter that allowed the NCACP to substantially affect the public 
atmosphere surrounding capital punishment. Alongside public meetings in 
many important cities in Britain, the organization published several pieces of 
literature, spurring public interest in abolition, based on both emotional and 
scientific appeals.159
 The mass of literature included Gollancz’ own Capital Punishment: 
The Heart of the Matter and Arthur Koestler’s Reflections on Hanging. 
Both works were passionate polemics against capital punishment that 
based themselves on moral arguments. As Gollancz succinctly stated in his 
work: “Capital punishment is wrong and that is all there is to it.”160 Koestler 
similarly focused on the art of polemic, but also wrote detailed the experience 
of other abolitionist countries, as well as delving into the emotional and 
personal aspects of a series of murders in Britain, all in an effort to disprove 
the alleged deterrence of the death penalty.161 The NCACP also connected 
abolitionist members of Parliament with the public, allowing both Sydney 
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Silverman and Reginald Paget the ability to publish pamphlets as part of the 
NCACP’s efforts. Their works included Hanged and Innocent?, a short book 
identifying several miscarriages of justice in the practice of the death penalty, 
including the execution of Timothy Evans.
 Debate on the Abolition Bill did not ignore the rapid changes in 
public interest, although Parliament was unsure how to deal with it. While 
Montgomery Hyde noted that public opinion was changing in support of 
abolition,162 Sir Robert Grimston argued that the public had been exposed to 
misleading propaganda.163 By 1956, 45 percent of the public disapproved of 
a trial suspension of capital punishment -- 24 percentage points lower than 
recent years past.164
 Nevertheless, debate over Silverman’s bill did not see any new 
arguments that had not already been mentioned in the Parliamentary 
discourse. Abolitionists continued to argue that capital punishment was not 
uniquely a deterrent, while retentionists saw it as necessary to keep homicide 
rates low.165 The abolitionists in Commons were victorious again, with a vote 
of 286 to 262.166 
 The Bill was then passed along to the House of Lords, where debate 
opened on July 9. While several Lords voiced their opinions in favor of 
abolition (in fact “nearly twice as large as had been expected”),167 the bill was 
“thoroughly trounced” with a vote of 238 to 95.168 At the center of the Lords 
debate was whether capital punishment was a uniquely effective deterrent, 
greater than life imprisonment.169 While Viscount Templewood cited the 
Royal Commission’s inability to find sufficient evidence of such a notion, 
MPs like the Lord Chancellor Viscount Kilmuir170 and Viscount Malvern171 
expressed their wholehearted opinion that capital punishment served as a 
deterring force in the United Kingdom. 
 Although the Government and the House of Lords stood strong 
against abolition, they could not ignore the constant pressure arising out 
of the House of Commons on the subject. The Cabinet was faced with a 
dilemma: it did not favor the complete abolition of capital punishment, but 
it recognized that there was a large demand from Commons for the practice 
to be reformed. The Cabinet wrestled with the question of deterrence. While 
they admitted that many other countries had abolished capital punishment 
without effect, they did not see Britain as civilized enough to deal with its 
abolition. The Cabinet was certain that Britain, as a unique society, would 
see a disastrous rise in homicide rates if capital punishment were done away 
with.172
 A compromise seemed on the horizon, and it came in the form of 
the 1957 Homicide Bill, introduced by Home Secretary Lloyd George in 
November of 1956. The Home Secretary had personally recommended that 
capital punishment not be abolished173 and the Government justified the bill’s 
support by noting, “public opinion desired a compromise and did not want 
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total abolition.”174 The bill, however, did not modify the death penalty per se. 
Rather, it modified the law of murder. It sought, amongst other pursuits, to 
amend the law by creating categories of capital and non-capital murders.175 
The Government, exploiting its majority in the House of Lords, passed the 
bill quickly through committee without amendment, and through the Lords 
unaltered. The Homicide Bill became law in March.176
The 1960s: Culmination
 The movement towards abolition, meanwhile, quickened its pace 
as it became readily apparent that the Homicide Bill of 1957 was illogical 
and flawed. More members of Parliament disregarded public opinion, of 
which a majority still favored retention, in the 1960s, and by the government, 
though hardline retentionists still relied on it heavily. By the time Sydney 
Silverman introduced a new abolition bill in 1965, nearly all obstacles for 
the abolitionists were gone, paving the road for the final riddance of the 
death penalty in Britain. And while the Parliamentary debates in the 1960s 
regarding the abolition of capital punishment offered few new arguments 
that differed from those in the 1940s and 1950s, the debate did become even 
more centralized on the issue of deterrence.
 By the beginning of the decade, the 1957 Homicide Bill was proving 
to be a disaster. Ironically, the failure of the bill, which was meant by the 
Government as a concession to abolitionists, strengthened the case against 
the death penalty. Its underlying reasoning was that some murders required 
the death penalty while others did not, a move that the Royal Commission 
had explicitly warned against.177 While, for instance, a farmer who shot his 
wife would be executed, a farmer who had bludgeoned his wife to death 
with a shotgun would not. While a thief who accidently killed a person when 
startled would be hanged, a man who thoughtfully carried out a plan to 
poison would not.178 
 Many abolitionists were against the bill from its inception. Hugh 
Klare, general secretary of the Howard League, thought the bill to be 
“illogical.”179 Ironically, abolitionists were assisted by the bill’s consequences, 
especially in regard to the issue of deterrence. After the bill was passed, the 
proportion of capital murders increased while the proportion of non-capital 
murders decreased, the exact opposite of what proponents of the death 
penalty as a deterrent predicted.180
 Even the Government, in its own inter-office communications, 
recognized that “there [was] a growing recognition that the Homicide 
Act of 1957 was a mistake” but that “this cannot be said publicly until 
the Government is prepared to propose an alternative.”181 Richard Butler, 
Secretary of State for the Home Office, stated in a memorandum that because 
of the Homicide Bill he was “under considerable pressure to do something 
about capital punishment” and expected “increasing criticism of [his] 
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decisions in individual cases, and increasing Parliamentary pressure for 
debates about them.”182 
 This pressure was a result of the religious and political elites turning 
against the death penalty in Britain. In the space less than of a decade, the 
Church of England had completely reversed its attitude towards capital 
punishment -- a “complete revolution.”183 Some members of the clergy, like 
the Reverend F. P. Coleman, even made motions in Parliament against the 
death penalty. Bishop Mortimer of Exeter pressed the House of Lords for 
abolition. Many clergymen also started giving speeches against the morality 
of capital punishment. As the religious elite turned against the death penalty, 
many of their followers did as well.184
 The public outcry over the recent controversial capital cases had 
not left Britain’s conscience. While the majority of the British public still 
supported the institution of capital punishment, by about a three-to-one 
ratio, that support had fallen substantially from previous years.185 The cases 
had damaged the public image of the practice. Almost all those who had 
“recently made up their mind against capital punishment” said that a “major 
factor” in their decision were “recent hanging cases.”186 In the elite and 
educated circles especially, the cases had served as another nail in the coffin 
of the death penalty. 
 By 1965, abolition seemed inevitable, and in the November of that 
year, despite public opinion and a rising crime rate, the political elite passed 
the Murder Act.187 It suspended the death penalty in Britain for a period 
of five years.188 Even the Government, who in the 1950s had held steadfast 
against abolition, by 1964 saw abolition as inevitable.189
 The debates of the political elite, continuing in Parliament, mirrored 
the culmination of the various forces that emerged against the death penalty 
in the 1950s. Often citing the results of the prior Royal Commission, members 
of Parliament focused heavily on the issue of deterrence. Yet although there 
were significantly fewer members defending capital punishment, the debate 
still lasted for two days.
 Sydney Silverman stood center stage once again, chastising the 
failure of the 1957 Homicide Act, and stressing the irrelevance of public 
opinion polls, which still showed a large majority against the abolition of the 
death penalty.190 Both Houses significantly devalued the question of public 
opinion. As Silverman asserted: “we do not govern ourselves in this country 
by referendum.”191 It was readily apparent that Parliament would weight 
polling data much less than had been considered in the late 1940s.
 After Silverman’s speech, the retentionists in both Commons and 
in Lords spoke overwhelmingly about deterrence. Lord Molson tried to 
delegitimize the statistics disproving the deterrence of the death penalty, 
arguing, “If I were subjected to a great temptation to commit murder, the 
knowledge that the penalty was death would be a great help in resisting 
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that temptation.”192 Lord Chuter-Ede retorted that it is “most unusual for any 
crime of murder to have been long premeditated,” and thus such knowledge 
would not be an efficient deterrent.193 The Earl of Haddington cited the 
results of the Royal Commission to support the illegitimacy of the practice 
of capital punishment.194 Similarly, the Lord Bishop of Chester cited the 
testimony given by Professor Thorsten Sellin, a prominent sociologist at the 
University of Pennsylvania, to the Royal Commission.195 The Commission 
had asked Sellin if “capital punishment cannot, on the basis of your figures, 
be exercising an overwhelming deterrent effect.”196 Sellin answered that his 
data could not support the existence of such an effect.197 The Bishop also cited 
the Evans case as a tragic miscarriage of justice.198
 At the conclusion of the debates in Parliament, Commons voted 355 
to 170199 to pass the bill, and Lords subsequently agreed by a vote of 204 
to 104.200 A caveat was added to the bill throughout the process, however: 
abolition would not necessarily be permanent, but would rather be placed 
on a five-year ‘trial’ period. 
 While the Act was not debated until 1970, the Government, especially 
the new home secretary James Callaghan, hinted that it was looking at 
making abolition permanent the year prior.201 The most important part of the 
‘trial period’ was a report being compiled by the Home Office Research Unit 
on the facts and figures of the abolition experiment.202 This report, entitled 
Murder 1957-1968, showed that murder rates had increased from 3.9 per 
million in 1965 to 4.2 per million in 1968, but that this rate had been steadily 
increasing from 1955 onwards, reinforcing the idea that murder rates were 
disconnected from the state of capital punishment.203 
 The data were used to the abolitionists’ advantage. When the new 
home secretary, James Callaghan, introduced a motion to make the Murder 
(Abolition of Death Penalty) Act of 1965 permanent,204 Gerald Gardiner, Lord 
Chancellor, pointed out in the pursuant debate that the murder rate had not 
significantly changed in the past ten years.205 But the House of Lords was not 
the only arena in which such data were used. The Times, on December 15, 
1969, ran a letter signed by 35 criminologists stating they felt “compelled to 
point out that there is nowhere in any of the voluminous statistical material 
about murder and the death penalty any conclusive evidence as to its special 
deterrent value.”206
 While public opinion stood strong against the permanent abolition 
of capital punishment, at over 80 percent, Parliament largely ignored their 
views.207 At the beginning of the debate on his motion, James Callaghan 
stated that:
There are times when Parliament has to act in advance of public 
opinion and give a lead. On penal questions it is not uncommonly 
the case; Parliament has done it before and Parliament was not 
wrong. Let us give a lead again today.”208
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Commons debated Callaghan’s motion for seven hours and carried it 
343 to 185. In the Lords, it passed with a majority of 46.209 After two decades of 
fervent debates, novel data collections, and complicated political movements, 
Parliament had finally abolished capital punishment permanently.
Part III: The Influence of Entrepreneurial Elites and of Public Opinion
 For the first half of the post-war period, policy in the United States 
seemed to be on the same track towards an end of executions as found in 
Great Britain. This section will, through both theoretical and comparative 
analyses, explore some explanations of why the United States may have 
diverged from that path towards permanent abolition, instead reinstating 
and strengthening its institution of capital punishment.
 One of the most commonly made arguments for the failure of 
abolition in the United States and the success of abolition in England 
attributes the disparity to the political elites of the United Kingdom, who 
were less willing to bend to public opinion on the subject.210211  Consequently, 
the first part two parts of this analysis will deal with elite actions and public 
opinion. I will first weigh the influence of elite political entrepreneurs on the 
development of capital punishment policy in the two countries. I will then 
similarly analyze the influence of public opinion. In an effort to weigh the 
influence of each of these I will try to ascertain the extent of their effects on:
 (i)  The initial efforts for abolition
 (ii)  The prioritization of abolition as a pressing concern for   
  government
 (iii)  The reversal of abolition in the United States
At the end of this section, I will advance again and defend the central point of 
this paper: that the influence of a textual Constitution helped derail America 
from its path towards abolition and instead re-entrenched the death penalty 
by creating a new basis for its legitimation.
The Influence of Entrepreneurial Elites
 Particular elite individuals in politics had strong influences on the 
development of capital punishment policy in both the United States and 
England. The narratives of both countries feature influential abolitionist 
figures in government who worked in tandem, consciously or otherwise, 
with interest groups advocating for abolition. These entrepreneurial elites 
can explain why each country made an initial effort for abolition and also 
why those efforts eventually gained enough traction to warrant serious 
government attention. Nevertheless, while the actions of interested elites 
may explain why abolition was initially introduced in each country, and why 
it was important on each country’s governmental agenda, those influences 
do not sufficiently explain why the United States made such a significant 
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backtrack in the 1970s.
 (i) The initial abolition efforts on the federal level in America and 
in Britain were both sparked by interested ‘entrepreneurial’ politicians. In 
America, and on the legislative front, Senators Morse and Hart introduced 
and supported several bills in the early 1960s that took steps towards ending 
capital punishment. Morse, whose home state of Oregon abolished the death 
penalty by popular referendum in 1964, was a “relentless advocate for all 
forms of Constitutional protection under the law,”212 and his stance against 
the death penalty was no exception. Senator Hart, meanwhile, as chairman 
of the congressional subcommittee of Criminal Laws and Procedures, held 
numerous hearings on the death penalty, though few were consequential.213 
Combined, Senators Morse and Hart were largely responsible for introducing 
and focusing discussions in Congress on capital punishment -- discussions 
that were very rare before the 1960s. 
 MP Sidney Silverman had a similar but much stronger effect in the 
British legislature. He was vocal in all of the debates between 1947 and 1965, 
often speaking first and framing the discussion in his own terms. Silverman 
was, much like Morse, a relentless advocate for abolition, introducing 
abolitionist measures in 1948, 1956, and 1965. But Silverman also took further 
steps in his project than any similar American politician. He co-founded 
and worked closely with the National Campaign for the Abolition of 
Capital Punishment to create a link between the public and elite campaigns 
for abolition. Kingdon214 would likely identify Silverman as a “policy 
entrepreneur” for abolition because of his persistence and unconditional 
attachment to the project. Although America had politicians who were very 
interested in abolition like Senator Morse, none of these individuals persisted 
as consistently and as strategically as Silverman in the United Kingdom.
 The American narrative had a stronger figure, though, in its judiciary: 
Justice Goldberg. Goldberg took the initiative to bring the capital punishment 
debate into judicial grounds. He had recruited Alan Dershowitz as a clerk 
in 1963, and had asked him on his first day to prepare a memorandum 
that could find capital punishment to be “cruel and unusual” in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment. Goldberg’s “extraordinary initiative” resulted 
in a memorandum that was circulated around to the other justices had a 
“bombshell effect” on the Court.215
 Although the memorandum was not made available to the public 
at the time, Goldberg would soon transplant its arguments into a dissenting 
opinion that initiated the NAACP’s Legal Defense Fund (LDF) to challenge 
capital punishment through litigation. Goldberg had no explicit connection 
with the LDF, like Silverman had with the NCACP. Even so, the dissenting 
opinion he volunteered after Rudolph v. Alabama “awakened interest in the 
constitutionality of capital punishment.”216 The ACLU also adopted a formal 
position against the death penalty in 1965, as it had been “encouraged by the 
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‘Goldberg signal.’”217
 As evidenced by the narratives, the influences of political elite and 
interest groups can therefore largely explain the initial abolition efforts in 
both England and the United States. Silverman and the NCACP led the charge 
for abolition in the former while Goldberg and his effectual connection to the 
NAACP’s LDF led the charge in the latter.
 (ii) The actions of elites can also explain why the abolition of capital 
punishment was placed so prominently on both the British and American 
government agendas. 
 While the United States had interested congressmen, like Senators 
Morse and Hart, pushing for abolition, their efforts were largely unsuccessful 
(though they did appear to be slowly gaining more traction). Before the 
legislative actions in the United States could amount to significant legislation, 
the judiciary, in 1968, took over the issue of capital punishment. Primed by 
Goldberg’s dissent, the LDF put considerable pressure on the courts to make 
a final decision on the constitutionality of capital punishment. The LDF 
thereby directed significant judicial attention to the issue of abolition and 
effectively drove it higher on the broader government’s agenda.
 The LDF orchestrated a widely dispersed legal strategy in its efforts. 
It reasoned that with a “campaign of test cases,” it could create a death row 
“logjam,” pushing the judiciary to favor abolition.218 In 1967, with money 
granted from the Ford Foundation to fight for the rights of the indigent, 
the LDF provided assistance to over fifty men and created a “Last Aid 
Kit,” circulating it around to overburdened public defenders and criminal 
lawyers.219 The “Last Aid Kit” was a toolkit for capital punishment cases. 
It contained drafts of petitions for habeas corpus, applications for stays of 
execution, and legal briefs that put forth every significant constitutional 
argument against the death penalty.220 By making its arguments and influence 
available to all death row inmates, the LDF put pressure on the America 
judiciary from many sides to do something about the constitutionality of 
capital punishment.
 In England, the efforts of Silverman and the NCACP heightened the 
awareness of the issues concerning capital punishment in both the public and 
in Parliament, effectively placing abolition high on the political agenda. The 
relationship between Silverman and the NCACP forged a wider collaborative 
effort between abolitionist MPs and community activists to increase social 
awareness of the death penalty and its ills. 
 The political abolitionist elite in England engaged in a widespread 
drive of persuasion. This approach differed from the litigation strategy in 
America, where such efforts were not thought to be necessary in order to 
push the Supreme Court to find capital punishment unconstitutional. The 
NCACP, with its publications, town meetings, and community activism, 
likely increased the importance of capital punishment in the public sphere. 
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Gallup suddenly started asking the public questions about capital punishment 
much more often in the early 1950s.221 While it is unclear whether or not the 
publication and propaganda efforts by the NCACP and the political elite 
had a large effect in swaying the public towards abolition, especially since 
public opinion never turned predominantly against the death penalty, it 
likely helped to develop capital punishment into a “leading issue” by 1960.222 
Moreover, Silverman’s “entrepreneurial” activities allowed him to take 
advantage of this change as a “policy window”223 of opportunity in order to 
push the issue of abolition to the upper ranks of Parliament’s agenda. 
 (iii) The motivations and activities of the political elite cannot, 
however, explain the backtrack by the United States from abolition in the 
1970s. No remarkably influential elite figures, nor significantly organized 
interest groups, led the charge against abolition between Furman and Gregg. 
Gottschalk224 writes that there was no “grand mobilization by interest groups 
to change the context of litigation” on capital punishment. She also observes 
that Furman, for instance, “did not ignite conservative groups to fight for the 
death penalty with the same intensity they mobilized against abortion after 
Roe v. Wade.”225
 Admittedly, there were some prominent elite figures in American 
politics that came out in support of the death penalty before the Gregg 
decision. New York City Mayor Ed Koch, for instance, declared his support 
for the death penalty by saying that, “when the killer lives, the victim dies 
twice.”226 
 The pleas of elite American retentionists, however, were not much 
different from those of some political elites in England who similarly came 
out in support of capital punishment during its moratorium. MP Duncan 
Sandys, for example, collected over 800,000 signatures for a petition submitted 
to Parliament, calling for the revocation of abolition. Sandys also recruited a 
number of small elite conservative groups to call for the reinstatement of 
capital punishment.227 Their efforts were unsuccessful.
 In America, such interest groups did not organize elite retentionist 
opinion. Instead, collective reactions to the moratorium came mainly from 
some state legislatures. These legislatures signaled their distaste with the 
Court’s decision by passing laws to circumvent the Furman decision and 
reinstate capital punishment. 
The Influence of Public Opinion
 There are strong similarities in the public opinion of capital 
punishment between England and America in the period of 1940-1975. Both 
were strongly against the abolition of the death penalty, and both deviated 
only slightly from this position throughout the course of the abolitionist 
narratives. Although public opinion itself cannot explain the initial abolition 
efforts in either country, which were mostly elite movements, this section 
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will explore its influence on agenda-setting in England and its influence in 
the American backtrack on abolition in the 1970s. This section will conclude 
that public opinion cannot by itself explain the American reneging of the 
abolition of capital punishment.
 (i) The force of public opinion alone cannot explain initial abolition 
efforts in either country. Most Americans and British always favored the 
retention of capital punishment. Nevertheless, changes in public opinion 
may have their own effects on political decisions. This was not the case in 
England, however. Silverman’s initial attempts to abolish capital punishment 
in the late 1940s predated the minor shift in public attitudes towards abolition 
in the 1950s. Moreover, this change was not very significant, and indeed may 
well have helped spark it.
 In the United States, changes in public opinion did coincide with 
initial efforts for abolition, both in the legislatures and in the judiciary; but 
it is unlikely that these changes can explain those initial efforts for several 
reasons. First, as in Britain, the abolitionist population in the United States 
was never large enough to mount a significant majority, and thus never large 
enough to create a strong voting bloc to sway elite opinion to pursue abolition. 
Moreover, abolition of the death penalty was never a politically fruitful 
endeavor for a politician to initiate.228 Judicial entrepreneurs for abolition, 
like Justice Goldberg, and the interest groups that pursued abolition in the 
courts, like the LDF, were isolated from the consequences of the electorate’s 
opinion.
 (ii) Public opinion also had little to no role in the United States in 
pushing abolition up on the government agenda. While public support for 
the death penalty was falling to new lows in the United States during the 
early 1960s, there was also no concerted effort from the public to consider the 
abolition of capital punishment on any foreseeably short timetable, at least 
on the federal level. This is not surprising since the prioritization of capital 
punishment occurred largely because of the legal assault of the LDF in the 
courts, a realm generally sectioned off from public attitudes. 
 In England, however, the influence of public opinion on the 
government agenda is more complex. Parliament wrestled with how to 
deal with public attitudes towards capital punishment from 1948 onwards. 
Despite the conclusions of Gottschalk229 and Garland230, I do not believe that 
Parliament was isolated in its decision-making on the death penalty from the 
demands of public opinion. This is evidenced in the Parliamentary records 
that I have reviewed: nearly all debates over capital punishment between 
1948-1969 frequently brought up the question of public opinion.
 It is interesting, first, to note that Silverman in 1948 made arguments 
expressly for why public opinion should be taken into account in decisions 
over the death penalty. But Silverman did not see raw poll data as a legitimate 
representation of “public opinion.” He believed it lay in the opinion of the 
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House of Commons, which provided an educated “cross section of the mind 
of the community.”231
 As public opinion, or at least poll data, began to trend toward larger 
support for abolition in the 1950s, abolitionists began to rely on it more 
frequently. MP Montgomery Hyde had argued that the changes public opinion 
towards abolition was a justification for ending capital punishment.232 The 
Government justified the middle-of-the-road 1957 Homicide Act by noting 
that public opinion was still mixed over abolition, and still predominantly 
opposed.233 The Government inferred that this meant the public was calling 
for a “compromise.”234 
 By the 1960s, public opinion had halted and reversed its momentum, 
growing more in favor of retention. In the 1965 debates, Lord Alpert, a 
retentionist, stressed that public opinion was “of great importance” and 
“must not be ignored.”235 Lord Ferrier similarly stressed the “dangers” of 
acting incongruently with public opinion.236
 Parliament and its members did not invoke public opinion 
consistently. While abolitionists justified arguments using its trends in the 
1950s, they rallied against using public opinion when trends reversed in the 
1960s. Members of Parliament clearly seemed to only rely on public opinion 
when current trends appeared to justify their pre-existing preferences on the 
death penalty. Likely because of this common strategy, public opinion in 
and of itself was rather ineffectual in driving the government agenda in one 
particular way.
 Nevertheless, the public had been significantly shocked by the 
cases of Bentley, Evans, and Ellis, had been subject to the NCACP and its 
proliferation of abolitionist literature, and had also read of the results of the 
1953 Royal Commission’s report in various national newspapers. In light of 
these facts, it is not particularly contentious to assert that capital punishment 
had risen much higher on the national agenda and in the public consciousness 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Public opinion, as an aggregation 
of pre-existing preferences, likely did not have a substantial effect on the 
government agenda, but its vocal abolitionist sector did participate in raising 
national awareness on the subject.
 (iii) The influence of public opinion on the reneging of American 
abolition is also complex. Public opinion was cited as central in the majority 
opinion of Gregg, which looked “to objective indicia that reflect[ed] the 
public attitude.”237 Meanwhile, the public had in some ways made attempts 
to overturn moratoria. California, for instance, overturned its own Supreme 
Court’s declaration of the death penalty as unconstitutional in early 1972 
(before Furman) by a referendum amending the state constitution.238 Within 
two years of Furman twenty-eight state legislatures had passed laws to 
reinstate the death penalty, modifying it to meet the Court’s requirements.239
 Nonetheless, as the Court is generally isolated from public opinion, 
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it was at the Court’s discretion that the public and the legislatures were 
allowed to have such an effect. The Supreme Court decided to incorporate 
the statistics of public opinion, and decided to make public attitudes central 
in the reasoning of Gregg. The Court could have just as easily halted all 
public attempts to end the moratorium; yet it did not take such a position.
 England had similar, and in fact greater, public opposition to 
abolition, especially after the passage of the Murder Bill of 1965, yet its 
government did not take that opposition seriously and did not overturn 
its original abolition. It is unlikely, however, that this is merely because 
Parliament simply ignored public opinion. Retentionists in Parliament 
brought up the public’s overwhelming stance against abolition frequently 
when the question of reinstatement was on the table in 1969. 
 In fact, since the American moratorium was imposed outside of the 
representative branches of the federal government, one would think it more 
intuitive that America would have been less likely to renege on abolition 
than its British counterpart, which passed abolition through the legislature 
and in fact had higher rates of public support for the death penalty. It is 
unlikely, therefore, the public opinion itself had much effect on reinstating 
the death penalty in the United States.
 Let us briefly then review the conclusions of this section. We have 
an explanation of how initial abolition efforts came about in both countries: 
they came from interested elites with the ability to create political and 
legal pressures in government. We have an explanation of why abolition 
was transformed into a priority issue: again these came largely from elite 
pressures, although abolition efforts in England were likely helped to a small 
degree by the national atmosphere, ignited by current events. We also have 
a very partial explanation of why America may have reneged on its abolition 
of capital punishment, namely some sort of a disorganized combination of 
elite and public opposition. Yet this explanation is not very tenable, because 
England faced parallel types of pressure after abolition and nonetheless held 
strong onto abolition. 
Part IV: The Influence of the Ambiguously Written American Constitution
 This section will pursue how the influence of the textual Constitution 
may fill in the gaps of the previous explanations, specifically in regard to 
the reinstatement and expansion of the death penalty in the United States. 
I will pursue two main analyses that suggest that the existence of a textual 
document, the Constitution, may have contributed to America’s deviation 
from the path on which it was traveling with Britain towards permanent 
abolition. The first analysis (Part A) will review the historical effect of the 
ambiguously written Constitution on the shift in legislative and public 
debates away from issues of deterrence and morality. This will directly lead 
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into the second analysis (Part B), which will argue that a debate around the 
ambiguous textual phrase “cruel and unusual” tended towards affirming 
the general majority retentionist attitudes regarding capital punishment and 
thereby created a new legitimation for the practice. 
Framing the Debate
 The early legislative debates surrounding capital punishment in 
England and America were remarkably similar, despite the fact that they 
occurred on slightly different timescales. The modern abolition movement in 
Britain lasted from 1948 to 1969. The parallel movement in the United States 
lasted from the early 1960s to 1976. The question of whether or not the death 
penalty was a unique deterrent lay at the center of both during their early 
phases. Retentionists and abolitionists alike relied on their respective views 
on deterrence in both countries in the justification of their positions.
 The centrality of deterrence in the debate over abolition is evidenced 
by the British move to convene a Royal Commission in 1949 tasked with 
investigating the issue. The results of the Commission would prove fruitful 
for the abolitionists, and the debate in England never wavered from the 
frame of deterrence. Abolitionists, in other words, were able to ground the 
debate in a frame that, in light of empirical evidence, proved to be in favor of 
their side. The British retentionists were not successful in moving the debate 
to a different arena, nor were such efforts very pronounced. 
 In the early 1960s, the American abolitionist congressmen did not 
pursue a different path than their English counterparts. These politicians, 
too, attempted to use the published data of criminologists, sociologists, and 
psychologists to prove that the death penalty was not a deterrent. The results 
of the 1953 Royal Commission even reverberated in the halls of the Capitol. 
Representative Multer submitted into the congressional record, alongside 
six other statements, the results of the Commission, all in an effort to prove 
that the death penalty did not deter people from committing crimes. The 
two countries, in their debates over capital punishment, were very parallel 
during the period immediately after their abolitionist measures began. 
 But there was a clear divergence between the two countries when 
the Constitution became involved. The LDF began its assault against capital 
punishment in the judiciary by the late 1960s. In 1968, the first Supreme 
Court decision regarding the issue, Witherspoon v. Illinois, announced to the 
country that the Court was willing to criticize the longstanding institution of 
capital punishment in America. 
 Almost immediately, Congress responded to the Court’s signal. 
While prior to 1967 there were no mentions of the “unconstitutionality” of 
the death penalty in the congressional records, as the Supreme Court became 
more interested in the constitutionality of the death penalty, debates in 
Congress began to preemptively address the issue. By 1971, Congress was 
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discussing whether or not capital punishment could be understood as “cruel 
and unusual punishment” and Senator Hart attempted to convince Congress 
that it should rule that it was.240 While he and others still referenced the ideas 
of deterrence, as before, the way in which deterrence was incorporated into 
these debates had changed. For instance, Hart’s introduction of the Death 
Penalty Suspension Act (S. 1969) adapted his deterrence argument into an 
argument that the death penalty was “cruel.”241 Debate increasingly involved 
a question of whether or not any failure of the death penalty to deter counted 
as an adequate explanation for why it was “cruel,” rather than whether or 
not the punishment truly did deter.
 England, at the mid-way point in its abolition narrative, had 
intensified its debate over deterrence. Armed with the results of the Royal 
Commission’s report, abolitionists seemed to fall on the winning side of 
the Parliamentary discussions. Without the question of constitutionality, 
retentionists had few arguments to draw upon to support the protection 
of the death penalty, and were, despite the recent data, boxed into merely 
repeating their beliefs that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent. In light 
of the 1953 Royal Commission report, this maneuver was destined to fail. 
The English focus on deterrence meant whichever side could marshal more 
objective fact on their side was more likely to succeed.
 Yet such debate still took time -- in England there stood over twenty 
years between Silverman’s initial efforts and final abolition. In America, 
the courts took over the issue before less than a decade of congressional 
debate. Moreover, debate lulled after the judicial involvement became more 
pronounced. As Representative Kastenmeier noted, there was a “growing 
but unofficial consensus that [questioning capital punishment] ought not 
to be done […] until final Supreme Court decision of all the constitutional 
issues.”242
 After the Court’s decision in Furman, the judiciary’s rulings had 
an even more pronounced effect on legislative debates, as congressmen 
attempted to read the decision and the Constitution in the manner that 
helped them the most. The phrase “cruel and unusual” became more central 
to the debate, for it was the judiciary’s deciding factor of whether or not the 
death penalty was constitutional. 
 Additionally, the phrase introduced ambiguity into the debate. 
While the English discussions had revolved around a subject that was open 
to empirical measurement (i.e. the deterring effect of the death penalty), the 
American focus on “cruel and unusual” did not. As Caleb Foote observed 
seven years before Furman, the Eighth Amendment “represent[ed] some of 
the most ambiguous language in the Bill of Rights.”243
Cruel and Unusual: Interpretive Judgments vs. Social Science
 The debate in America then became not one oriented towards 
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discovering social scientific evidence of objective behavioral patterns, as had 
been the case in England, but one oriented towards textual interpretation. 
While debates over more objective domains gravitate towards claims that 
can be empirically supported, debates involving interpretation are more 
muddied and unpredictable. In an attempt to analytically understand the 
complex dynamics that resulted in the reinstatement of the death penalty 
in America, I draw upon theories of philosophical hermeneutics and inter-
subjective communication. I first apply such theories to the notion of 
‘interpreting’ the Constitution. I then look at, and discuss the significance 
of, the discursive interaction between the Supreme Court and various 
legislatures, both state and federal. I cast this interaction as inter-subjective 
communication and argue that it dialogically forged a meaning of “cruel 
and unusual” that played into the majority’s default opinion of capital 
punishment. I lastly compare this analysis to the English experience. In this 
section, I aim to conclude that the influence of the textual Constitution’s 
written normative standards helped re-establish the American death penalty 
by dialogically constructing a meaning for the Eighth Amendment that 
justified the punishment and created new legitimation for its persistence.
 Philosophical hermeneutics is indispensable to this discussion. It aims 
to account for what happens to us as we go about understanding the world, 
and it derives its basis from how we interpret texts. The constitutionality 
of capital punishment, of course, explicitly regarded whether or not the 
death penalty was, as per the text of the Constitution, “cruel and unusual 
punishment.” Rather, though, than pursuing the debate over normative 
hermeneutics, theories about the ‘correct’ way to apply some authoritative 
text to a decision,244 I here instead attempt to use hermeneutics descriptively. 
In other words, I seek to describe how the acts of interpreting the Eighth 
Amendment themselves led to the “entrenching of the death penalty.”245 
 Hermeneutics scholar Hans-Georg Gadamer, in Truth and Method,246 
provided an influential account of how we approach and come to understand 
the meanings of texts. He noted that his objective was to identify “not what 
we do or what we ought to do [in interpretation], but what happens to us 
over and above our wanting and doing.”247 Gadamer argues that a ‘reader’ is 
always necessarily situated in some sort of “tradition,” a position that creates 
for him a “historically effected consciousness.”248 The “prejudices” that result 
from this embeddedness interact as if in dialogue with the text, expanding or 
moving the “horizons” that limit one’s understanding from one’s particular 
vantage point.249 Interpreting a text, in other words, involves a “fusion” of 
these horizons.250
 As the American debate over abolition shifted towards issues of 
constitutionality, ‘readers’ of the Constitution (i.e. justices, congressmen) 
engaged in this process of interpretation, or in the “fusion of horizons.” In 
all such practices, they ‘read’ from a position of “communal tradition and 
148           SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal
Veering Off the Abolitionist Path in America
individual prejudices.”251
  Interpreting the Constitution on the issue of capital punishment 
was complex, however. Gadamer may well have summarized the tension 
that existed between modern abolition efforts and the Constitution when he 
wrote that:
 In […] legal […] hermeneutics there is the essential tension between the 
text set down  […] on the one hand, and on the other, the sense arrived at 
by its application in the  particular moment of interpretation.”252
When thinking of interpretations of the Constitution as involving such a 
tension, it is unsurprising that Furman produced such a “badly splintered 
Court.”253 Given the infamous ambiguity of the Eighth Amendment, and 
the relative lack of textual precedent explaining “cruel and unusual” at 
the time, the clause held an open world of meaning to be read. It had, in a 
sense, a vaguely defined background itself, and was therefore amenable to a 
variety of resultant understandings. It was only likely that the distribution of 
opinions would have been so dispersed. 
 But how then can we describe the subsequent convergence of 
Gregg? To pursue such an answer we also consider that ‘readers’ of the 
Constitution are not only engaging dialogically with its text, but are also 
engaging dialogically with other readers. We must investigate, as Vogel254 
writes, the “constitutional conversation that goes far beyond the technical 
legal discourse of judges and lawyers.” In a way, the Supreme Court, the 
Congress, and various state legislatures all “talked” to each other between 
1972 and 1976 regarding interpretations of “cruel and unusual.” The medium 
of this communication came in the form of Court opinions and legislative 
responses (i.e. bills, acts, and laws). The preceding analysis focused on 
isolated readers interpreting the Constitution. The subsequent analysis looks 
at the interactions of those interpretations in the public sphere.
 Specifically, I argue that through this communication a meaning 
of “cruel and unusual” was dialogically forged. Habermas255 notes that 
the purpose of inter-subjective communication in the public sphere is the 
reaching, or forging, of a shared understanding. Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
similarly “insist[…] on the cultivation of shared meanings and a shared 
public space as a premise of interpretive praxis.”256 
 The shared meaning of “cruel and unusual” that led to interpretive 
consensus came about from inter-subjective communication between the 
Supreme Court, Congress, and various state legislatures. After the Furman 
decision was handed down, Congress engaged in debate over its meaning. 
In attempting to pass new legislation to meet the requirements of Furman, 
Senators Eckhardt and Hruska noted that its definition hinged upon how 
each Justice had interpreted the Constitution. Eckhardt attempted to identify 
common currents underneath the Justices’ reasoning. He noted that if the 
standards of the ‘swing’ Justices were met, then capital punishmentwould not 
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be “cruel and unusual.” By way of this reasoning, Eckhardt was dialogically 
engaging the Court in crafting a shared meaning of “cruel and unusual.”257
 Similarly, the Supreme Court, in its majority opinion in Gregg, ‘read’ 
into the various legislative responses to Furman. In Gregg the Court assumed 
that the Eighth Amendment and “evolving standards of decency” necessarily 
referred to public opinion.258 Thirty-five state legislatures, as well as Congress, 
had passed laws introducing a modified practice of the death penalty after 
Furman, and the Court paid attention to these actions in Gregg.259 These 
laws essentially represented the collective opinion of each legislature as to 
the definition of “cruel and usual” -- they were communicative acts. Because 
the bills were passed, they were thus statements from each legislature about 
its interpretation of “cruel and unusual.” Specifically, they asserted that the 
specific practices they laid out were not “cruel and unusual.” Through this 
to-and-fro discussion, the Supreme Court and the legislatures conjointly 
built up a common understanding of the meaning of the phrase “cruel and 
unusual.”
 This dynamic, however, played into the interests of the retentionists 
since they represented the political majority. Critical Legal Studies scholars 
argue that the reading of the Constitution and constitutional cases “consists 
of political choice.”260 The most extreme forms of this critique claim that 
‘readers’ of the Constitution merely impose “their private value judgments 
on [its] text.”261 Despite the extremity of this position, it is consistent with 
the events seen in the reverberations of the Furman decision in Congress. 
While abolitionist congressmen claimed that Brennan and Marshall were 
correct in Furman, retentionist congressmen aligned with Douglas, White, 
and Stevens. Moreover, as legislative debate over capital punishment had 
been essentially suspended after the Court had become involved, Congress 
was still mostly retentionist. While Representative Fletcher Thompson (R-
GA), eight years before Gregg, had voiced his concern that the Supreme 
Court would “allow the minority to control the majority,” and impose “upon 
this entire nation and all the courts thereof the minority views of those who 
oppose capital punishment,”262 it appears that the Court did just the opposite, 
working together with the majority to reify its opinion as constitutional truth. 
Moreover, the Court also verified that the legislatures had not affronted 
the national opinion in its legislative responses to Furman. The Court, for 
example, invalidated the mandatory death sentencing laws that were passed, 
arguing that they were “repudiated” by societal standards.263 In total, these 
communications resulted in a textual meaning that was fixed via the weaving 
of a “social fabric of understanding.”264
 We may again juxtapose this sequence of events against the 
English experience. While the English also discussed and debated capital 
punishment, the domain of their discussion was significantly different. The 
English narrative centered on the issue of deterrence, a rational-scientific 
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topic, while the American narrative pursued the meaning of a textual phrase 
focused on more normative terms. In other words, the knowledge that the 
American debate eventually pursued became essentially different than the 
knowledge pursued by the English debates.
 Habermas265 characterizes forms of knowledge by the interests that 
drive them. Each form of knowledge has a corresponding organized mode of 
inquiry and methodology of production. For instance, Habermas contrasts 
the empirical-analytical sciences, based in a technical interest to predict and 
control the natural environment, with the cultural-hermeneutic sciences, 
interpretive modes of inquiry that derive from a practical interest to come 
to mutual understandings between social actors. In the case of the capital 
punishment debates, England pursued an empirical-analytical knowledge, 
that is, the question of whether or not capital punishment is effective as a 
deterrent against crime. This type of knowledge was obtainable through 
social scientific searches for measurable behavior patterns. The United 
States, on the other hand, pursued a hermeneutic knowledge, a shared and 
mutual understanding as to the meaning of “cruel and unusual.” From this 
characterization, we notice the much greater social nature of the American 
contention regarding capital punishment as compared to the British. While 
the debate in England sought more empirically based evidence of behavioral 
patterns, the American debate focused on socially constructing normative 
understandings.
 The effect of this social construction was to re-legitimate the death 
penalty in the United States. This line of events lies in stark contrast to 
the United Kingdom, which had no opportunities in its 1969 debates over 
reinstating capital punishment to do the same. The turn in debates towards 
the ambiguously written Constitution uniquely pushed the United States 
towards a re-entrenchment of the practice of capital punishment.
 Steiker and Steiker266 assert that the Gregg decision “legitimated” the 
practice of capital punishment. They argue, drawing on the work of Max 
Weber, that the decision proliferated an “experience of belief in the normative 
legitimacy of capital punishment.”267 Legitimation, it is important to note, is 
therefore essentially social. They also note that this social belief was “false 
and exaggerated” in the sense that it was induced “in the absence of or in 
contradiction of evidence” to what capital punishment was “really” like.268 
The researchers posit that legitimation occurs on at least two fundamental 
levels: “internally” with capital sentencers and other criminal justice actors, 
and “externally” with society at large.269 
 The narrative that I have compiled reveals legitimation on these levels 
and consistent with their effects. The turn to a constitutional debate over 
the death penalty overshadowed and diminished the absence of evidence of 
capital punishment’s value as a deterrent. After the Court’s decision there 
were pronounced changes both in courtrooms and in the national community 
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at large. The frequency of executions skyrocketed and the size of death row 
exploded to levels that were even higher than before abolitionist movements 
in the 1960s and 1970s270 -- a complete reversal of the earlier trend.271 This 
reversal was indicative of juries and judges more comfortable with doling 
out death sentences. Moreover, Gallup poll data show public support for 
the death penalty suddenly increasing by the late 1970s, and reaching record 
highs in the 1980s and 1990s.272 The results of the Eighth Amendment debate 
surrounding capital punishment seem to have had effectively led to a new 
legitimation for capital punishment as a social practice.
Conclusion
 A comparative analysis between the American and English abolition 
narratives yields insight into an explanation of the persistence of capital 
punishment in the United States today. In the first half of these narratives, the 
countries both appeared to be moving in the same direction, towards the end 
of capital punishment. Similarly, the initial debates over capital punishment 
in each country strongly mirrored the initial debates in the other. But the 
American debate suddenly changed when the NAACP’s Legal Defense 
Fund made efforts to push the issue of capital punishment into the courts 
and framed the discussion as one of constitutionality instead of deterrence. 
At this point, abolition efforts in Congress held back while the Court wrestled 
with whether or not the death penalty could be held unconstitutional.
 After the debate over the death penalty in America was taken over 
by the courts, time and attention were diverted away from the debate about 
the efficacy of capital punishment itself, a debate that the abolitionists in 
England had shown could and would likely be won with the analysis of 
social scientific data. The shifted debate focused instead on the different 
understandings of a normative textual phrase, “cruel and unusual,” rather 
than evidence gathered from the social sciences. As the American interpretive 
approach tended towards affirming the general supportive stance of the 
death penalty, it soon became a new basis for its legitimation.
 The narratives themselves are consistent with this explanation of the 
persistence of the death penalty in the United States. Nevertheless, the social 
and political worlds are complex. While the shift of the American debate to 
the ambiguously written Constitution was probably not the sole factor that 
led to the persistence of the death penalty, it did coincide with the point at 
which the United States suddenly veered off its trend towards abolition -- a 
trend that was slowly developing both in legislatures and in the community at 
large. This “veering off” point becomes very pronounced when the American 
abolitionist narrative is juxtaposed to that of the British, who marched slowly 
and steadily towards abolition over the course of twenty years. 
 It is important to note that the shift to the textualist debate in America 
152           SPICE | Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Undergraduate Journal
Veering Off the Abolitionist Path in America
was not in any way preordained, but rather was the effect of abolitionist 
elites and interest groups that took the initiative to push the debate out of the 
legislatures and into the courts. Ironically though, the constitutional realm 
gave retentionists much more ground to stand on when defending the death 
penalty as it was held under scrutiny.
 Further research to support the claims of this paper could look at 
similar narratives in other countries with codified constitutions. Were their 
abolitionist debates pushed towards textual normative standards located in 
their constitutions? And if so, what were the results of those debates? Did 
they confirm or reject the general opinion of that country on the issue of 
capital punishment?
 The legal legitimation of the death penalty can also help explain why 
the practice remains so entrenched in the 21st century. While it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to delve into the exact terms of that legitimation today, 
it does provide an account of how such legitimation may have originated 
in the 1960s and 1970s. When thinking of modern social institutions, it is 
necessary, I think, to trace how those institutions have developed and, more 
importantly, how the ways in which we think of those institutions have 
historically evolved. I hope that this paper has shed such insight into the 
peculiar American death penalty, the only example of capital punishment in 
the modern Western world.
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